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DOCTORAL SCHOOL OF LAW AND POLITICAL SCIENCES

THE MISSING CRITERIA OF HOMELINESS OF THE HOME IN THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE EUROPEAN NATIONAL MINORITIES

Summary of Doctoral Thesis

by

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1. A brief summary of the research objective

In my doctoral thesis, I tried to draw conclusions of a legal nature valid in the European context from the specific minority burden of homeliness. Building upon the issue of homeliness, my research had two main objectives. On the one hand, I sought to grasp the problem of the homeliness deficit[1] of national minorities as an objective, legal category. On the other hand, I tried to situate the issue of the homeliness deficit of minorities in the context of international legal regulations aimed at the protection of national minorities. In order to do the latter, I tried to develop a legal concept which i) fits well into the international legal concepts of the protection of national minorities, ii) extends or makes more accessible the rights claimed by national minorities at the level of the state, and iii) envisages a more homelike social order for minorities.

[1] By the homeliness deficit of national minorities, I mean the absence or deterioration of the homeliness of the geographical home.

2. Brief description of the studies carried out and research methodology

My doctoral research deals with a topic that has been less articulated in legal studies so far, namely the issue of the homeliness deficit of national minorities in Europe. By "homeliness deficit" I mean the lack or shortage of a feeling of homeliness of a geographical home. In the first two chapters of my thesis, I sought to answer the question of the extent to which the issue of the homeliness of national minorities is a legitimate problem, and how the problem of the sense of homeliness can be understood not merely as an emotion or psychological phenomenon, but as a concrete measure of the objective circumstances surrounding a person, as a social science term.[2] In the third chapter I examined the global and in the fourth chapter the European international systems of minority protection, identifying the correlations and standards that determine the protection of national minorities in Europe. Through a critical review of the protection of minorities in the European legal space, I scrutinize whether the legislation or legal system in question is compatible with the criteria of essentialized and objectified *homeliness*. After identifying the essential correlations of minority

[2] The use of the word *homeliness* in italics denotes a concept deprived of psychological content and endowed with a social scientific meaning.

protection in the European legal space, in the fifth chapter of my thesis I attempted to carry out the creative intellectual task of situating the objective category of *homeliness*, which has been identified earlier and describes social relations, as a problem that can be understood through legal studies. I employ various strategies to position the objective category of *homeliness* within the system of my findings about international law.

2.1. The issue of homeliness (Chapter 2 of the thesis)

The initial formulation of the problem of the homeliness deficit arose from the author's own recognition that a well-established minority identity with stable community objectives places a particular burden on minority members that majority members typically do not have to live with. The issue of homeliness was later successfully identified in the political literature of the Hungarian minority in Transylvania. The broad social debate surrounding the article of Sándor Makkai, former Reformed bishop of Transylvania, entitled “Nem lehet" (It cannot be), published in 1937,[3] proved to be a key factor in understanding the issue of homeliness. The discussion of Makkai's minority *non possumus* forms the basis of the thesis's starting point, the homelessness of

[3] MAKKAI, Sándor: Nem lehet. In: CSEKE, Péter – MOLNÁR, Gusztáv (szerk.): *Nem lehet. A kisebbségi sors vitája.* Budapest, Héttorony Könyvkiadó, 1989. 106–111.

minority existence. The former bishop argued that the minority question is insoluble, that the minority as a category is an "artificially created shameful shrine", which is "inhuman", "anti-life", "spiritually unbearable", "unworthy of man" and "in it humanity is doomed to atrophy".[4] In his article, Makkai further argued that all those who have been excluded from the possibility of majority national self-determination, have been excluded from the fullness of human life and have been degraded and humiliated in their human dignity.[5] He argued that within the framework of the "minority-keeping state", the majority "[...] claims for itself the setting of life goals and the means of achieving them, and thus renders the minority purposeless, because it considers it not to be integrated organically, but to be excluded, as a disturbing element of its self-fulfilment. A minority made aimless will therefore inevitably become a disruptive element."[6] He concludes that the indigenous minority becomes a stranger in its own homeland, where "[...] the self-fulfilment of a different national existence represented by the majority [...]" is taking place.[7] He sees the tension between the geographical and the spiritual home in the longing of the minority from its own home to the fullness of the national existence:

[4] MAKKAI, Sándor: Nemzet és kisebbség. In: op.cit. 230, 230–237.

[5] Ibidem.

[6] Ibid. 234–235.

[7] Ibid. 236.

> "The category of minority, however, not only represents an external impossibility, but also leads the minority into a dilemma within itself, in which the untenability of the situation is becoming increasingly apparent from within. The minority national piece clings to its earthly home, because its whole life has grown out of it and breathes in it, and yet still feels alienated from it, as its intellectual home can only be found in the completeness of their own national existence. Infinitely beyond and above the low aspects of the charge of political irredentism, this spiritual, existential irredentism is not only natural, but also in the highest degree honourable, because it is the screaming and wailing of the eternal human himself, and its silencing would mean the death of man."[8]

The bishop, known for his transylvanist views and his sense of community responsibility – to the disappointment of many – had already resettled in Hungary by the time his article was published. Contemporaries themselves acknowledged that there were few writings that prompted such a high level of minority self-reflection among the Hungarian community

[8] Ibidem.

in Transylvania as the article around which the debate had formed.[9]

In the second half of the 1980s, after Péter Cseke rediscovered and collected the material of the debate for his generation, the former members of the Limes Circle, which operated as an illegal intellectual workshop between 1985 and 1987, and the intellectuals[10] who formed the holding court of the Romanian Hungarian samizdat newspaper "Kiáltó Szó", formulated their own reflections on the debate that had taken place 50 years earlier.[11] Both Károly Veress's book[12] from 2003 and the present doctoral thesis are indicative of the debate's

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[9] The collection of texts published by Péter Cseke and Gusztáv Molnár contains 38 articles and letters in response to the article "Nem lehet". According to Dezső László's January 1938 article, "[A]fter looking back over the past few years, it can be clearly judged that hardly any other article has served the cause of minority consciousness as much as this one." LÁSZLÓ, Dezső. Ellenzék, 5 Jan. 1938 In CSEKE - MOLNÁR: op. cit. 126 - 128.

[10] Cseke Péter, Cs. Gyímesi Éva, Balázs Sándor, Fábián Ernő, Tóth Sándor, Jakabffy Tamás, Bende Farkas Ágnes, Szilágyi N. Sándor, Kozma Zsolt, András Gusztáv, Széplaki Kálmán, Visky Ferenc, Láng Zsolt, Visky András, Kereskényi Sándor, Kántor Lajos, Salat Levente.

[11] These were collected and published in 1995. See: CSEKE, Péter: *Lehet – nem lehet. Kisebbségi létértelmezések (1937 – 1987).* Marosvásárhely, Mentor, 1995.

[12] VERESS, Károly*: Egy létparadoxon színe és visszája. Hermeneutikai kísérlet a nem lehet-probléma megnyitására*. Kolozsvár, Pro Philosophia, 2003.

significance beyond its own time and the validity of the question of the homeliness of minority existence. Nándor Bárdi also points to the validity of the Transylvanian Hungarians' "search for home" in his book “Otthon és Haza” (Home and Homeland), in the introduction[13] to which he writes that the construction of the incomplete structure of homeliness is nothing other than part of the Transylvanian intellectual tradition. [14] Cs. Gyimesi Éva is quoted as saying: "the analogy between home and homeland is obvious. One provides the freedom and framework for personal identity expression and fulfilment, while the other does the same for national identity. And we give back to it the fruits of our voluntary creative work. Being at home in the homeland means living so naturally and self-evidently in harmony with

[13] BÁRDI, Nándor: *Otthon és Haza*. Csíkszereda, Pro-Print Könyvkiadó, 2013. 10.

[14] As part of this tradition, we can identify the distinction between “homeland“ and “patria“ in Sándor Reményik's work: See REMÉNYIK, Sándor: Miért hallgatott el Végvári?: „Elhallgatott, – mert visszás valami: / Daltalan szívvel tovább dallani. / Elhallgatott, mert új parancsok jöttek, / Új rendelése az otthoni rögnek. […] / A sors kiáltott: válasszatok hát: / A szülőföldet-e, vagy a hazát?” Cited: K. LENGYEL, Zsolt: *Haza és szülőföld. Tanulmányok a transzilvanizmus történetéhez (1867-1945)*. Kolozsvár, Erdélyi Múzeum-Egyesület, Kriterion Könyvkiadó, 2023. 196.

personal and national identity that the question of identity does not even arise."[15]

Having pointed out the legitimacy of the question of homeliness, my investigation in the sequel was directed at how the problem of the sense of homeliness can be grasped not merely as an emotion, a psychological phenomenon, but as a concrete measure of the objective circumstances surrounding us, as a social-scientific term. The concept of *homeliness* developed in my thesis is a contextual condition. We are at *home* in a situation according to the extent to which our environment takes our characteristics and presence for granted. So, something is not *homely* because we know it well or because we are free to do many things there, but because our particular characteristics, our presence, our nature, our aspirations are taken for granted, and thus remain unreflected. And unreflected means that our characteristics are not conspicuous, not remarkable, not subject to interpretation, understanding, acceptance or any other similar cognitive operation. Thus, the discourse of *homeliness* is not a discourse of recognition,

[15] CS. GYIMESI, Éva: Honvágy a hazában. [1986]. In: CS. GYIMESI, Éva: *Honvágy a hazában. Esszék, interjúk, publicisztikai írások.* Budapest, Pesti Szalon, 1993. 139.

acceptance, or tolerance, since only that which is not self-evident is to be tolerated.

To explore the relationship between the questions of home and minority existence, I have used the concept pairs introduced by Rogers Brubaker in the social sciences of "marked" and "unmarked." [16] *Marked* individuals are those whose characteristics become reflected in a given interaction, while *unmarked* individuals typically do not have their unique characteristics reflected in the same way. Depending on the context, an individual can be either *marked* or *unmarked* in a given situation. The state of being *unmarked* refers to the condition in which a particular characteristic does not become the subject of interpretation, understanding, acceptance, or any similar cognitive operation. *Unmarkedness* is thus the state of homeliness. Thus, linguistic, ethnic, national minorities are unmarked in those societies, communities and situations in which there is a lack of reflection or indifference to the problem of identity, and the social order does not prescribe consequences other than de facto equality if we express ourselves in the specific language or manner of an ethnic group in the given context.[17] The

[16] See more: Rogers BRUBAKER – FEISCHMIDT, Margit –Jon FOX – Liana GRANCEA: *Nacionalista politika és hétköznapi etnicitás egy erdélyi városban.* Budapest, L' Harmattan, 2011. 224–225.

[17] It is important to note, however, that there are objective differences – such as mobility impairments or other physical or mental disabilities – around which, even if no social conventions of rightness or

essential difference between *marked* and *unmarked* is analogous to the difference between legal minority and majority. In a state, it is typically the dominant community that becomes the unmarked and the minority that becomes the marked. And the specificity of the *marked* is precisely that the characteristics of the individual are not self-evident and are not surrounded by indifference. In my thesis, I point out that the comfort of *unmarkedness* is what *marked* individuals strive for whenever they realize parallel, separate social formations, institutions and contexts for *marked* individuals. The essence of these separate social contexts is precisely to *unmark* the otherwise *marked* individuals in the wider society. Within these social structures, the *marking* rules of the wider society are reversed: the characteristics that are *marked* by the wider society become *unmarked* and those that are generally *unmarked* become *marked*. In the context of Transylvania, such spaces are the so called Hungarian spaces, the ethnically *marked* places (e.g. Hungarian cafés in Kolozsvár), *marked* institutions (e.g. minority schools), or *marked* legal entities (territorial autonomy for minorities). Thus, for example, during the Hungarian Student Days in Kolozsvár, a student remains *unmarked* as a Hungarian and becomes *marked* as a Romanian. Through my research, I have essentialized and

wrongness are formed, the difference affects the individual's daily life, social life and interactions to such an extent that it can only be compensated for at great sacrifice or not at all.

objectivized the concept of "homeliness" through the concepts of self-evidence, unreflectiveness, and *unmarkedness*, detaching it from the common, psychological layers of the word.

2.2. Protection of European national minorities under international law (Chapters 3-4 of the thesis)

To properly position the problem of *homeliness* in the systems of minority legal protection, in the third and fourth chapters of my thesis, I have identified the essential correlations of minority protection in the European legal space defined by the global and European international legal systems. I have reviewed with particular attention how international law defines national minorities and provides equal treatment for them. Therefore, the focus of my research was less on the cultural rights of minorities and more on the concepts of equality and national minorities. Moving from the global to the regional, in the third chapter of my thesis I explored the system of minority protection under the auspices of the United Nations, and in the fourth chapter I discussed the European systems of minority protection (OSCE, CoE, EU). In addition to the analysis of the literature, I conducted my research based on primary sources, such as the adopted documents and *travaux préparatoires*. Thus, these two chapters combine a legal theoretical and legal historical approach.

From a systematic perspective, it can be considered significant that the issue of national minorities has been crucial in the legislative processes of the UN, even if it has received treaty-level attention with difficulty, as a sort of hidden agenda from the very beginning. Although it is a great loss that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights did not include specific rights for national minorities, it cannot be neglected that in the resolution titled "Fate of Minorities," the UN explicitly stated that it cannot remain indifferent to the fate of minorities. The work of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities has been of particular importance in exploring the links between the protection and definition of national minorities during this research. I find it significant that, regarding the protection of national minorities, the Committee found it necessary to distinguish between groups that try to integrate into the majority as individuals and those who intend to preserve their differences as a community. Furthermore, I consider it an important finding that the defining feature of national minorities, which appears in the attempts to define the concept from time to time, is their non-dominant position of power in the given state. The main significance of this lies in the fact that the lack of homeliness of national minorities is not accidental. The reason for this is that the general legal order, which leads to inequalities, requires the adoption of a specific legal

order to ensure real equality of treatment. But national minorities by definition do not have control over the establishment of the general legal order. This explains why territorial autonomy, which provides legislative powers, can be suitable for increasing the sense of home of a particular minority on their homeland. It also provides an answer to why members of numerical minorities with veto rights in consociational systems[18] do not consider themselves as minorities. In this way, if the lack of political dominance is seen as a defining element of national minorities, the loss of a sense of home is indeed a particular experience of minority existence. One could also say that those who consider themselves minorities are likely to sympathise with and find themselves in the problem of the lack of homeliness.

In the fourth chapter, I sought to identify the defining correlations and standards of minority protection in the European international legal systems. In the first

[18] The model of consociational democracy is a model of democracy based on cooperation between elite groups in fragmented or pillared societies. These groups are protected through a system of veto rights against another group usurping control of the state, the sovereignty of the state. Bosnia-Herzegovina and Belgium are among the most illustrative European examples of this model. The concept is primarily associated with Arend Lijphart. See: Arend Lijphart: *Democracy in Plural Societies.* Yale Univ. Press, New Haven-London, 1977. See more: Salat, Levente: *Etnopolitika a konfliktustól a méltányosságig. Az autentikus kisebbségi lét normatív alapja.* Marosvásárhely, Mentor, 2001, 100–119.

subsection, I reviewed the political and partly legal documents established in the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. In the second subsection, I conducted a systematization of the rich legal sources of the Council of Europe and the relevant case law of the European Court of Human Rights. The third subsection covered the analysis of the legal sources, case law, and political impacts of the European Union concerning the protection of minorities. The expansion and international extension of minority protection standards in all three systems – apart from the Language Charter – occurred in the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union in the name of ensuring geopolitical stability. Nevertheless, through the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, the development of the prohibition of discrimination to the benefit of national minorities can be described as continuous. Additionally, the monitoring mechanisms of the two minority protection conventions created under the auspices of the Council of Europe also carry out significant discourse shaping and standard-setting work in the European legal space, which gradually become part of the jurisprudence of the ECHR. The Venice Commission also periodically identifies minority protection standards that can be considered authoritative in this European legal space. In summary, I have made the following observations about the European legal framework regarding minority protection:

i. The existence of minorities is a matter of fact and does not depend on state recognition.
ii. Membership in a minority group is based on an individual's self-identification as long as the group does not dispute it. If there is objective affiliation, the group cannot unilaterally exclude someone who wants to belong to the group.
iii. The prohibition of discrimination against members of national minorities presupposes not only formal equality before the law but also provisions to achieve effective or real equality. Special measures can result inequalities at the level of individuals.
iv. The compensatory rights granted to members of minorities - other than those provided through the general legal order - must not lead to discrimination.
v. No one can be restricted in exercising the rights guaranteed by the general legal order.
vi. The scope of compensatory rights above formal equality, beyond the extent provided by international conventions remains to the discretion of the states. Accordingly, the question of how and to what extent compensatory rights, beyond those prescribed by international law, are ensured for minorities falls within the exclusive discretion of states.

2.3. The question of homeliness, as legal category (Chapter 5 of the thesis)

After having identified the correlation of minority protection in the European legal space, in the fifth chapter of my thesis I attempted to carry out the creative intellectual task of positioning the objective category of *homeliness* – which has been identified earlier and describes social relations, as a problem that can be interpreted – a as problem of legal science. I have tried to position the objective category of *homeliness* within the framework of my statements on international law, in a way that is compatible with the existing paradigm of minority protection. I have tried to place the issue of homeliness in the context of existing legal systems through three different approaches. a) Firstly, I approached *homeliness* as an inherent value or a demand that is part of human nature, providing an opportunity for a legal philosophical approach. b) The approach of *homeliness* as a legal principle made possible the extension of the legal concept of equal treatment. c) The possibility of *homeliness* as a free-standing right was outlined, but I considered it a less expedient approach, one that was more difficult to reconcile with current legal developments. These three approaches are presented in more detail in Chapter 3 of this thesis.

3. Summary of the new scientific results of the doctoral thesis

My doctoral thesis has taken a novel approach to the problem of national minorities in Europe. The novel approach stems from the realisation that, while the protection of national minorities is unthinkable without the protection of ethno-cultural identity, a well-established, stable minority identity imposes a particular burden on members of the minority that is not typically experienced by the majority. This burden is none other than the fact that the minority's own geographical home is not sufficiently homelike. I have defined *homeliness* in terms of the self-evident nature of the individual's presence, characteristics and aspirations. According to this, for example, our city is *homelike* if our presence, our expression of identity, our needs and aspirations derived from our identity are so self-evident to the authorities and inhabitants of the city that they remain, so to speak, invisible, unreflected. Thus, the question of *homeliness* does not ask what a national minority can do to maintain, express, recreate and develop its own identity, but whether it can do so in a self-evident way or because of specific rules, dedicated social consensuses and political agreements. Thus, the discourse of *homeliness* is not a discourse of tolerance or recognition, since only what is not self-evident needs to be tolerated, recognised or

accepted. Things taken for granted are unreflected, *unmarked* in society. I have been able to trace thoughts that coincide with this realisation in the Transylvanian minority literature on the burdens of minority existence.
Using this objectified, essentialized, novel social science concept of *homeliness*, I have made new legal theoretic statements that fit into the European legal space. My hypothesis was that the criterion of *homeliness* is not necessarily absent from international regimes for the protection of national minorities. Indeed, in exploring the European legal space, I did not conclude that the *homeliness* perspective is necessarily absent from systems of minority protection, but I also had to admit that international law is completely lacking the *homeliness* perspective or the incentives for the development of legal protection following the criterion of *homeliness*.

Perhaps the most important contribution of my doctoral thesis to the theory of the legal protection of national minorities is the recognition that minority rights – as specific rights regulated by a special legal order different from the general legal order – can also have a negative impact on the quality of life of a national minority. i) One of these negative consequences is the loss of *homeliness* in the individual's own living space and society. ii) Another negative impact on the quality of life of minority persons can be the flawed discourse of additional rights,

which hampers the efforts to enforce or to extend the protection of minorities.

We can also consider as an innovative legal theoretical achievement the placement of the objective category of *homeliness* in the context of international law through various strategies. I have attempted to situate *homeliness* in the unity of my knowledge of the rights of European national minorities through three strategies: a) *homeliness* as a starting point for legal philosophical considerations; b) *homeliness* as a legal principle; c) *homeliness* as a right.

a) *Homeliness* as a starting point for legal philosophical considerations

At this point, I looked at the concept of *homeliness* as a possibility for legal philosophical considerations. I have examined the aspiration to *homeliness* as a peculiarly human motive, not chosen by man. In this way, the aspiration to *homeliness* can be seen as a specific justification for the protection of minorities. Also as a legal philosophical consideration, I examined *homeliness* as an inherent value, which thus made it the object of a legitimate aspiration, a source of further legal considerations. From a philosophy of law perspective, I have positioned *homeliness* and the aspiration to it as a new dimension of equal treatment, outside the intrinsic

value of freedom. The legal philosophical approach of *homeliness* led to the following findings:

i. *homeliness* is an intrinsic value similar to, but independent of freedom and equality.
ii. *homeliness* is one of the dimensions of equal treatment;
iii. equal freedom does not necessarily lead to equal *homeliness*;
iv. equal *homeliness* is unattainable in the absence of equal freedom.

b) Homeliness as a legal principle

In the sequel, I have placed *homeliness* within the system of non-discrimination as an institution enforcing *equal homeliness*, which derives from the extension of the principle of equal treatment. Here, I have taken as my starting point the legal institutions of direct and indirect discrimination that can be used to protect formal and real equality and have pointed out the importance of distinguishing between the general legal order and the minority legal order. I concluded that for the enforcement of *equal homeliness* the prohibition of discrimination, should meet the following requirements:

i. treatment of national minorities that is identical to or different from that of the majority is permissible only if it does not

impair access to rights recognized by law, including human rights conventions;

ii. derogation from the former rule may be made only in the interests of a legitimate aim and by proportionate means to the aim pursued;

iii. no person shall be restricted in the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed by the general legal order;

iv. the needs of groups – subject to different treatments – of the same nature must be guaranteed alike by the general legal order.

c) Homeliness as a right.

As a third strategy, I raised the possibility of creating a right to *homeliness*. I found this to be a less expedient strategy for two reasons: i) on the one hand, the review of the development of international minority protection suggested that states are less open to recognising entirely new rights; ii) on the other hand, a right to *homeliness* would in practice presuppose an equality of treatment and non-discrimination regime that would be based on the criterion of *homeliness*, which, as discussed earlier, is perhaps easier to introduce into the dynamically developing field of equal treatment and non-discrimination.

In my view, the idea of *homeliness* as an inherent value, similar to but independent of freedom and equality, has

considerable potential for development in legal theory. The idea of *homeliness* as an inherent value, while completely alien to the current paradigm of minority protection, is at the same time compatible with it. The idea of *equal homeliness* derived from the inherent value of *homeliness* makes it possible to think further the extension of non-discrimination in an organic way. Non-discrimination could thus be used to increase the sense of *homeliness* of minorities who are unnecessarily *marked* and to move the problem of minority rights claims out of the often unjustified and obstructive discourse of special and additional rights.

4. List of publications in the field of the doctoral thesis

1. BETHLENDI, András: The International Protection of National Minorities in the First Decade of the United Nations. In: *Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law*, Vol. 11, 2023, forthcoming.

2. BETHLENDI, András: Informális érdekérvényesítés a jogérvényesítéssel szemben. In: *Korunk*, 6/2022, 65–73.

3. BETHLENDI, András: A kisebbségek jogai és a kisebbségi jogok közötti különbségről. In: Szalayné, Sándor Erzsébet (Ed.): Egyenlő bánásmód irányelvek – helyzetkép: Tanulmányok az uniós joganyag tagállami alkalmazásáról, Pécs, Magyarország: Publikon Kiadó, 2019, 169-186.

4. BETHLENDI, András: Drepturile lingvistice în administrația publică. In: Fábián Gyula (Ed.): *Standarde controversate ale coexistenței juridice dintre majoritate și minoritatea maghiară,* Hamangiu, București, 2022, 141–184.

5. BETHLENDI, András – ILYÉS, Zsolt: Educația în limba maghiară în România: In: Fábián Gyula (Ed.): *Standarde controversate ale coexistenței juridice dintre majoritate și minoritatea maghiară,* Hamangiu, București, 1–140.

6. BETHLENDI, András: Az „otthonossághoz való jog", mint a kisebbségi létparadoxon jogi feloldása. In: *Erdélyi Jogélet*, 3/2020. 13–30.

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10. BETHLENDI, András – SZEREDAI, Norbert: Az erdélyi románok kisebbségjogi jogállása 1918 előtt. In: *Acta Universitatis Sapientiae Legal Studies*, Volume 2, 2018, Scientia Publishing House, 129–163.

11. BETHLENDI, András: Esettanulmány a kolozsvári többnyelvű helységnévtáblák ügyéről. *Magyar Kisebbség, 2016/*2, 115–120.

12. BETHLENDI, András: Etnicitás és otthonosságérzet. In: *Többlet*, 2016, 136–158.

13. BETHLENDI, András: The Problematics of Collective Rights in the Protection of National Minorities (revised and updated). In *MIREMIR Conference Proceedings*. ISPMN Publishing, Cluj-Napoca.

14. BETHLENDI, András: A nemzeti kisebbségeket megillető egyéni és kollektív jogok problematikája (I.). In: *Magyar Kisebbség*, 2012/1-2. 222 – 233.

15. BETHLENDI, András: A nemzeti kisebbségeket megillető egyéni és kollektív jogok problematikája (II.). In: *Magyar Kisebbség*, 2012/3-4. 205 – 229.