# Identifying the customary rules on the prohibition of the use of force in the light of the prohibition of intervention and interference in internal affairs

(doctoral thesis)

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## I. Purpose and rationale of the research

It is a relatively rare phenomenon in law that the meaning, content and scope of a rule that is the cornerstone or starting point of a branch or area of law is considered to be as vague, elusive and often even indeterminate as the prohibition of the use of force in international law. Moreover, the prohibition of aggression is indeed the most important rule in the international legal framework, and it could even be said that the entire contemporary international legal system is based on this principle, and consciously so. Even the League of Nations set itself the goal of completely banning war after the horrors of the First World War. The Second World War convinced the victors once and for all that international relations could be based on nothing other than *jus contra bellum*. It is also true, of course, that it was a very fortunate set of circumstances, since the United States emerged as the strongest state after the war with unquestioned dominance, unchallengeable authority and power. Thus, for perhaps the first time in the history of mankind, a state has become almost hegemonic, basing its very existence on democratic foundations, on a system of checks and balances and on the rule of law. And it was also a happy coincidence that the US was not in its isolationist phase, so that it had the political will to build a forum for international cooperation on a completely new basis, or at least on a platform based on a radical rethinking of the model of the League of Nations.

Although in practice the objectives have been achieved to a rather limited extent, it is undeniable that, for the first time in the history of nations, a world forum has been created whose existence no state can deny. There is no formation which, having achieved statehood, has not sought to conform to its rules and to participate in its daily functioning. And it is undeniable that the UN Charter has become a point of reference that no state can question. This also applies to the principles enshrined in the Charter, in particular the prohibition of recourse to armed violence. Yet, for decades, the question of what the principle of the prohibition of aggression itself means, or even what the concept of aggression is, has seemed intractable. This was not a new problem; the League of Nations had already spent decades trying to define aggression but had not succeeded. And it took about half a decade to give the UN member states a laconic and non-binding definition. And even that remained rather simplistic! All in all, therefore, the basis on which states should base their international relations remains uncertain. In principle, the formula is very simple: it is forbidden to launch a war of aggression. In practice, however, the general problem of law is multiplied in the field of aggression. In its abstract world, law tries to establish general rules, preferably indicative in all cases. Reality, however, is a realm of concrete facts, and there is no precise and detailed abstract law that can cover all the actual facts. How true is this in the case of the use of force, which is still poorly developed, despite the tons of legal treatises, articles and books that have been published on the subject. As I have said, there are few areas of law where a norm that is considered to be the basis of everything else raises so many questions and uncertainties. It is as if, in contract law, we do not know exactly what a breach of contract is, what the conditions for its conclusion and validity are, and we do not even know for sure what a contract is. Or it is as if, in criminal law, we know that the state has criminal powers, but we cannot define what a crime is, what guilt means and what the consequences are.

This is therefore the general context of the prohibition of aggression or armed violence in international law. In addition, the reputation of international law is often tarnished by the fact that its most important principle is so easily and naturally violated by states and non-state actors with a great deal of licence. The situation is not made any easier by the fact that, in most cases, States behave like children, or, to put it more critically, one could say that States are notorious liars, duplicitous and cynical hypocrites. And indeed, States bend both the law and reality to

their own self-interest. They do so in the UN Security Council and General Assembly. In the light of this, it is not easy to find consistent practice and legal understanding in relation to aggression. Therefore, once again, many conclude that detailed rules on the use of force cannot be established. Nota bene, the practice and legal conceptions of the States arise because the Charter only lays down the basis of the prohibition, in the light of which detailed rules can only be determined by the rules of customary law.

Consequently, this thesis has also set itself the ambitious goal of identifying the customary law rules on the use of aggression. More specifically, the research intends to propose a practical method for finding customary rules. There are several reasons for this specificity and narrowing. On the one hand, the customary law rules presented at the end of the thesis will undoubtedly generate controversy, since scholars often evaluate the same practice in completely and utterly different ways. Moreover, although the collection of customary rules is an important task, they will only be authoritative if they are drawn from a source that is sufficiently authoritative to be followed by states and international dispute settlement fora. On the other hand, given the scope limitations of this dissertation, it would be an impossible task to identify a customary rules covering all areas of the use of force. And while highlighting an area in isolation can greatly improve understanding, it will always remain fragmented, and there is a risk that the rules of the corpus of customary law narrowed down to that area will later become entangled in contradictions that cannot be resolved in isolation. The paper therefore calls for attention to methodology, despite the fact that it has also identified customary law and done so to a large extent. The aim was to make the methodology practical. And nothing proves a method's workability or unworkability better than a test. So, the research was carried out to establish the customary law in order to demonstrate the methodology and to make it subject to scientific scrutiny to decide whether the method followed would lead to better results than the previous ones. It should also be noted that the methodology is not fundamentally theoretically based, so the paper does not include a chapter providing a detailed dogmatic and logical analysis and justification of the methodology. In the introductory chapters, the basic concepts of the methodology are explained, but its detailed presentation is done through using it.

The limitation mentioned above is that the thesis analyses and establishes the customary law rules on the use of force only in relation to the prohibition of intervention and interference in internal affairs. The reason for this limitation of scope has already been mentioned. Consequently, the focus of the thesis is on conflicts where the trigger for intervention, invasion or occupation by force is some form of internal instability, internal political change or civil war in the target state. These are interventions which, as a rule, would not be of an international nature and would therefore be a matter for the internal affairs of the state. Although they are important and inescapable areas for the use of force, the paper does not go into detail on the question of wars of aggression by definition, nor on the question of self-defence conflicts that go beyond intervention, nor does it discuss the specific situation of terrorism, which has undoubtedly brought a number of important new considerations to the prohibition of aggression. It is essential to note that the analysis only covers conflicts arising after the entry into force of the UN Charter, which completely overhauled the previous legal concept and is clearly the starting point of the international legal system, which also represents a caesura in the interpretation of customary law, at least in the area of the use of force, since it has in any case created a new legal framework.

To sum up, the aim of this research is to identify the customary rules in the field of the use of force and the prohibition of aggression in the field of intervention and non-intervention, and to do so with a methodology that includes some simple but essential corrections, which may be

able to identify customary rules in the use of force in all fields, preferably with a more convincing database and in a form that has sufficient authority.

## II. Research methodology

An important question when launching a research project is whether the thesis contributes to science, whether it can add something new or different. With regard to aggression, it can be argued that, in addition to the numerous academic articles, the issue has been dealt with in detail in large, authoritative and thorough academic volumes and books. The works also cited extensively in this thesis are indeed inescapable contributions to the discourse, but they are essentially twofold in their approach. Either they discuss the rules for the use of force in general terms, i.e. they discuss the rules and institutions in a theoretical division. In this case (the theoretical approach), it is also common for the authors to simply present the different interpretations and positions, but not to make a clear statement on whether the rule exists, but rather to present the existing positions in a thorough way. Another feature of such works is that, although they certainly refer to practices, they do not discuss them in detail, but rather list one or two of them by way of example. The other approach is case-based collections. These works deal with a huge body of cases. Accordingly, each chapter includes a description of the facts and context of the conflict, a description of the response of the international community, and then a detailed legal analysis. While this method does indeed provide very deep and detailed information on the conflict in question, two criticisms can be made of such collections. On the one hand, several chapters raise the issue that the legal analysis section does not seek to draw conclusions from the international community's reaction, but rather provides a kind of jurisprudential overview. This is not to be followed in identifying customary law because customary law has no bearing on the correct interpretation of the law. The opinio juris of the States, which is linked to practice, does not accept that a practice should be regarded as unlawful on strict doctrinal grounds, for example. If a practice is accepted as lawful by the international community, it will result in lawfulness with respect to that customary rule if it is maintained with respect to other similar practices. Thus, in identifying customary law, legal analysis can only take into account the attitude of States. The other shortcoming of case-based volumes is that they tend to analyse only individual conflicts, and then only in isolation, one by one. Thus, these works do not present an aggregation, a comparison and a conclusion as to which rules are confirmed by the practice and the State attitude associated with it, and which rules are refuted or not.

The paper essentially attempts to harmonise the two methods with minor corrections. It takes the case-based approach as a basis, i.e. it follows its methodology. It gives a factual and contextual account, then presents the international response and concludes with a legal analysis. However, in presenting the international reaction, it draws almost exclusively on the minutes, resolutions and drafts of the UNSC and UNGA meetings. This is because, although opinio juris is not exclusively presented here, it is here that it is most documented, most solid and most official. Indeed, if there is a reaction within the UN, it would almost certainly overweight any other form of publication. Not for legal reasons, but purely because of the weight and centrality of the organisation. The fact that the UN certainly fulfils one of its purposes, i.e. that it is indeed the absolute first forum for international interaction, also means that it is here that states actually express their legal understanding and assessment of a given conflict. The emphasis is also on resolutions and their drafts. There is no doubt that in the meetings of the Security Council and the GA, numerous positions are expressed and often relevant details are adequately assessed by individual states. On the one hand, interventions *per se*, are not as authoritative as votes. It is not typical for states to argue for their position on the basis of legal analysis and the necessary

elements of the rules, and this is not expected, since the SC and the GA are political bodies. The second problem is that even if there are valuable legal positions taken by individual States when speaking, these are difficult to systematise and evaluate systematically. Not all States speak at a meeting, for example. Thus, it would be difficult to find a quasi-universal opinio juris based on individual interventions. However, with a few exceptions, all States vote when a draft resolution is adopted. In other words, it gives a clear, documented position, an opinion that can be converted into opinio juris, if you like. It is true that this makes the explicit legal assessment less precise, the elements and details of a rule are much less visible, but it has the advantage that everyone expresses an opinion on it and it is possible to measure the percentage of votes in favour. These texts, which are generally more pseudo-general, condemnatory or authorising, can also be used to determine the acceptance of a detailed rule, since we know the reasons for the State using force and, in the light of this, they are either accepted by the international community or not. And in doing so, it either confirms these rules or it does not.

In identifying customary law, an important basic premise is that it is not the decision of the SC or the GA that proves a customary rule, but the attitude of states towards them. This is best measured by how they voted on the resolution. The paper measures this support in percentage terms. However, since abstentions and even no votes are possible in addition to yes and no votes, it is difficult to express this accurately and convincingly in numbers. The research has chosen to give three percentages of support for a decision. The first is the inclusive, or optimistic, assessment, which counts only yes and no votes. This considers the no vote and the abstention vote as neutral. This is rarely the case in reality. Even a 'no' vote can mean acceptance of the rule but rejection of its application. Abstentions and no votes can really mean anything. It can mean support or opposition. In most cases it is the latter. Accordingly, the second percentage indicates exclusive support. This is the pessimistic approach, counting only yes votes as support, and no and abstentions votes as opposition. There could certainly be more sophisticated methods of calculation than this, for example abstention could be counted as a lower support or lower opposition value. It could be less than 1 value, but the determination of this would be arbitrary and would not track the reality that we do not know for sure whether we are for or against a rule by abstaining. Thus, the clear advantage of the model used is its simplicity. There is an optimistic and a pessimistic approach, i.e. a best and worst case scenario. And the simple mathematical average of these two percentages gives us the third number: the average support, which covers the degree of acceptance of the resolution and therefore the rule it contains.

Perhaps the most important innovation, although it is a fairly simple and almost self-evident one, is that draft resolutions are perfectly capable of proving opinio juris. It is a common misunderstanding that if a decision is not adopted, it is interpreted as an opinio juris weakening the rule. Or, in some cases, they note its existence and that it was only vetoed because it was not adopted, but it is not used to strengthen the rule. Yet whether or not a decision has been adopted is completely irrelevant to customary law. We know how many voted for it and how many voted against it. This alone is enough to show the opinio juris. For example, compare a resolution passed with 7 votes for, 3 against and 5 abstentions; and compare to one passed with 14 votes for and one veto against. Which better justifies a customary law rule? Of course the latter! There is no justification for not using vetoed draft resolutions as a reference point for the opnio juris required for customary rules. And this is not only true for vetoed decisions. If a draft decision is not adopted simply because of a majority in favour, then the draft is a valuable source of insight into the legal concept that does not support the rule. The veto issue, of course, only arises in the case of SC decisions. At this point, it is necessary to note that the paper gives equal weight to SC and GA decisions and drafts. Thanks to the percentage of support expressed

in the evaluation, it is possible to compare the support for the SC and the GA decisions assessing the same conflict. And it can be stated that in most of the cases examined, the support for the narrow SC and the plenary GA was almost identical. This allows us to conclude that it can be assumed that the support for SC decisions also reflects the acceptance of the international community as a whole. Thus, even if only SC resolutions or drafts are available, they can be used to justify quasi-universal practice and opinio juris.

Also, an important innovation is that the research places great emphasis on applying the concepts of exception, justification and exemption to the specific case. This idea, which will be developed in more detail later, is based on the logic that, since the SC and the GA are political bodies, their assessment on the use of force is primarily political, although fortunately the legal aspects are inescapable in the Charter regime and the decisions tend to refer to these aspects. However, there may be a case where conduct that would be illegal and neither an exception nor justification (excuse) applies, yet the international community does not wish to condemn the act and does not claim international legal responsibility for it. This is primarily on moral grounds. In essence, it is a question of fairness beyond the law. In such cases, however, an acquittal is not weakening the rule, even if it is not necessarily convincing to claim that it strengthens the rule, but it is certainly not contrary to opinio juris. It is true that it is very difficult to establish when the international community grants an exemption and when it excludes illegality, but the distinction should be sought, since the identification of the customary rule could be distorted if an exemption were to be assessed as a ground excluding illegality.

Picking up the methodological thread again, it was mentioned above that the research takes a case-based approach as a basis, providing a legal analysis after a factual and international community response assessment. The following difference in methodology should be mentioned here. In the legal analysis part, the thesis completely excludes jurisprudence and does not refer to textbooks or academic articles. The research follows the methodology that, since it is a question of identifying customary law, it is necessary to analyse the facts presented and the response given to them by the international community. The legal analysis thus seeks to translate what are often political manifestations into legal concepts. In other words, it tries to determine, on the basis of the drafts cited and their support, which customary rules can be used to justify the case and with what degree of support. It gives an indication of how the States themselves have assessed the conflict in legal terms. The research uses a single tool to establish the law: the judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), if any, in the case. This is because the ICJ (also) usually decides on the basis of customary law. And here it is particularly true that if the court found that a certain rule was of a customary nature, it would be very challenging to take a position against it. Another advantage of case law is that it is much more precise in terminology than decisions. In general, very important and precise distinctions are pointed out by the ICJ, clarifying the issues involved in a legally thorough manner. As for the other (theoretical) approach, the paper follows this approach in two parts. Since the explicit aim of the research is to identify customary rules, it is essential to provide a comprehensive and holistic presentation in the form used in the theoretical approach. This is most apparent in the theoretical chapters, where, of course, the issues are presented based on legal sources and jurisprudential works to introduce the subject and to clarify the terminology used. But there is also a need to synthesise the theoretical approach in the part of the thesis presenting and, arfuing for the rules of customary law identified, which latter can be interpreted as a commentary. The findings revealed by the case-based analysis are presented there, classified thematically and formulated as general rules.

## III. Brief summary of the research findings

The dissertation is divided into two major parts. A general theoretical and legal history section, and a section presenting selected cases and identifying customary law. The theoretical block starts with a legal history overview going back to ancient times. The historical overview is intended to be both introductory and interesting, and to show that, contrary to the view, perhaps not only held by non-lawyers, that before the UN Charter there was no prohibition of aggression and that the starting of war was completely free and unregulate, in reality limits on the starting of war had already been established by the early appearance of jus gentium. It is true that their legal binding force was rather dubious, they were rather moral guidelines, but one has to see the antecedents of the development of jus contra bellum in the case of the Greeks and the rather militant but law-abiding Romans. And early Christian theories are an important station because they have fundamentally determined the legal conception of just war by the jurists who developed modern theories of international law. Of particular interest and importance is the mention of the fact that even European rulers used concepts such as aggressive war, self-defence, offensive alliances or European peace and security. The chapter thus demonstrates that the post-World War I jus contra bellum efforts did not appear in a vacuum and were not without precedent. And the chapter concludes with an overview of the League of Nations and a discussion of state practice between the two world wars, illustrating how the League of Nations saw similar goals and solutions as desirable in international relations. Contrary to popular perception, there was no explicit ab ovo inertia in the world body and, more importantly, the entire UN system was essentially a revision of the League of Nations. And the League of Nations itself was an astonishingly radical rethinking of international interaction, imagining relations between states along the lines of peaceful settlement of disputes and negotiation rather than warfare. It is particularly noteworthy that initiatives were already being taken at this time to legally ban war and to define aggression, which at the time, despite all the work that had been done, was still considered an impossible mission. It is, however, a very valuable point of comparison that the problems that emerged at this time were still being grappled with by the international community, even during the UN attempt at a definition, with essentially the same content. Finally, the concluding section of the chapter, which describes armed conflict and discusses the international reaction, can be compared with the second major unit of the thesis.

The road to the fall of the League of Nations also paved the way for the UN, and the extent to which the UN has risen to the challenge of international peace and security can be compared with the section on its shortcomings. The section following the legal history describes the foundations and the most important developments of the existing UN legislation. The chapter begins by outlining the process of the genesis of the Charter, with particular attention to the regulation of international peace and security and the use of force. The chapter also contributes to a better understanding of the Charter system and helps to provide a historical interpretation of the Articles of the Charter relating to the use of force by describing the travaux préparatoirs. It then describes the relevant rules of the Charter, with particular emphasis on terminology. The importance of this is that the research argues that there is a difference between aggression and other forms of use of armed force, and thus tries to draw some conclusions about the rather sloppy treatment of terminology in the Charter. Apart from the Charter, the most important source (although not strictly speaking a source of law) for aggression is the UNGA Resolution 3314, which is the result of a huge and protracted codification exercise. The chapter describes in detail all the main stages of the process, including the different versions and the positions of the States. While this section does indeed discuss the work of the committees at length, its usefulness lies in the fact that it gives a very accurate picture of the position that states have taken on a particular rule. In addition, it should be remembered that, although this chapter obviously precedes the review of cases, many conflicts preceded the adoption of the decision.

In other words, the process of drafting is also interesting because armed conflicts were constantly raging during the drafting process, so this process cannot be imagined in a vacuum either, as the drafting process and the armed conflicts described were very much parallel. Finally, the paper presents the results of the work carried out, i.e. a brief evaluation of the definition that has emerged.

The chapter on aggression and its legal institutions is a classic theoretical chapter. It introduces the concepts used in the section on customary law. Again, but this time in much more detail and in a more systematic way, the chapter deals with the issue of terminology. A precise understanding of the terminology is not just a legal-linguistic game, since there are fundamental consequences to be drawn from the use of a term, as is illustrated by the use of the terms self-defence, aggression and armed attack, which are discussed in this chapter. The paper therefore compares the terms used in the Charter and in GA Resolution 3314 in a systematic and contextual way. It then clarifies the most important concepts by presenting and contrasting jurisprudential positions and, in many cases, by providing its own interpretation. In this section, the legal instruments most frequently invoked as exceptions, justifications or excuses are discussed and presented in detail. In this chapter, the research basically refrains from supporting its conclusions with practical references, thus trying to keep a clear distinction between the theoretical and the customary law identification sections, thus taking care to maintain the purity of the methodology.

Certainly, the identification of customary legal rules is difficult to present without a thorough understanding of customary law. Consequently, the research devotes a separate chapter to demonstrate the essential elements of the concept. It also outlines how, despite its presence since ancient times, there is a considerable amount of uncertainty and challenges associated with the field of customary law. After exploring the legal value of customary law, the way it evolves, and the question of the entities shaping custom, the paper also provides a brief presentation on why the seemingly simple two-component definition - practice and opinio juris - holds significance even at a theoretical level. The second part of the chapter delves into the generally recognized method for establishing customary law, or at least its undisputed foundations, developed by the International Law Commission (ILC) in the most authoritative manner, both for the identification of customary laws and for imperative norms. The thesis thoroughly reviews both codification works, as they form the basis of the research, and the prohibition of aggression as a peremptory norm and the general customary rule prohibiting the use of force can be understood in light of these two codification works. In addition to the ILC materials, the chapter also addresses the method employed by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in defining customary law.

The final section of the theoretical chapters briefly addresses international state responsibility and aims to highlight its significant role in the identification of customary law. Particularly, the distinction between exceptions, justifications, and exemptions is relevant, as it shapes the entire methodology as outlined above.

The second major section of the thesis presents and evaluates armed conflicts on a customary law basis. The division of chapters into conflicts before and after the Cold War essentially serves to facilitate readability, despite the considerable changes brought about by the collapse of the bipolar world. This collapse did not bring significant or substantive changes in shaping customary legal rules, and even less so in the functioning of the United Nations. In addition to the previously explained methodology, it is worth mentioning that the research aimed to work with a representative database. However, due to the limitations of scope, this could only cover

a fraction of conflicts post-1945. The selection of conflicts may be subject to criticism, as there are numerous other cases of armed interventions that could be considered. The research sought to provide a comprehensive overview, preferably from all continents, including well-known major conflicts in which great powers were involved, as well as incidents with little or no major power interest. Another consideration was to include cases where the UN essentially took no action or even convened no sessions. Naturally, cases where UN missions intervened in a conflict were not covered, as they did not constitute a substantive legal question within the scope of the research, although, of course, a comprehensive customary legal codification on the use of force cannot exclude the analysis of the detailed rules of UN missions. However, the thesis also discusses cases where the intervener was not a state but a regional or sub-regional organization or even a military bloc. The section dealing with conflicts supports textual exposition, presenting international reactions and legal analysis along with tables to aid understanding and justify the assertions. In addition to the visual representation of the mentioned percentage support, summaries of the cases are provided based on the most important criteria (intervening party, nature of intervention, international community acceptance). Each case also includes a summarized table of the referenced resolutions and drafts, and in every instance (if recorded), it is indicated how precisely each state voted.

Instead of a conclusion chapter, the substantive outcome of the research is the presentation of the identified customary rules. This is the author's own deduction and formulation. First, the rules themselves are listed, organized by articles and topics. This is followed by substantiation, which can be interpreted as a commentary. The purpose of this latter part is to convince the reader that the applied method is suitable for drawing supportable conclusions regarding the identification of customary rules. The textual exposition includes those General Assembly resolutions that are of a general nature and formulated the general rules. It also lists the cases elaborated in the previous section that support the rule. The combination of the two establishes that it is indeed a customary rule, as both general and specific legal opinions point to the same practice. As an auxiliary means of legal determination, this section refers to the resolutions of the International Law Institute establishing customary law, as they can also strengthen the rule. If there is an ICJ judgment, it naturally carries much greater weight. The substantiation of a rule concludes by listing the decisions and drafts used for substantiation, recording their support, and then calculating an average, which provides an interpretive framework, an approximate number for the support of that specific rule.

Finally, the Appendices include the Hungarian translations of those General Assembly resolutions that serve as support for the customary legal rules. This allows for a direct comparison with the complete text and context. The referenced decisions of the International Law Institute also appear in the Appendices, serving a similar purpose.

## IV. Publications of the author

- Arsboni.hu: A dél-afrikai fehér népirtás kérdéséről, 2018. július 15. https://arsboni.hu/a-del- afrikai-feher-nepirtas-kerdeserol/ (in English: Persecution and genocide claims in South Africa) 15 July 2018
- Új nép születőben: a roma nem-területi nemzet koncepciója in Pogácsás Anett és Szilágyi Pál (ed.) TehetségPONT 7. ‘DIES DIEM DOCET’ válogatott tanulmányok Joghallgatók tollából. (2019) pp. 197-215. (in English: The non-territorial concept of the Roma nationality in international law)

- Book Review: Vanda Lamm (ed.).: Emberi Jogi Enciklopédia, in Szabó Marcel(ed.): Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law, Eleven international publishing, 2019, pp. 573-576
- A kisebbségvédelem abszolút minimumának kérdése, avagy az etnikai tisztogatás kriminalizálásának szüksége in Kisebbségvédelem, Kisebbségi Jogvédő Intézet (2020) 2. szám. pp. 27-51. (in English: ethnic cleansing in international criminal law)
- Vizsgálhatja-e az Alkotmánybíróság az uniós jog alkotmányosságát? in Magyar Jog 2022/11 pp. 665-676. (in English: Constitutional Identity as a concept in the Hungarian Constitutional Court from an international law perspective)
- How the safe third countries concept result the prohibited non-refoulment and what are the limits of forum shopping in migration? in Acta Humana Vol. 10. No. 3 2022. pp. 181-196.
- Advanced Technology – Advanced Terror, An Interdisciplinary Study on Disruptive Technology and The Rule of Law in Hungarian Yearbook of International Law and European Law 2023 (11) 1. pp. 212-37.
- Trendi Terrorizmus: terrorista marketing, toborzás és megfélemlítés (in English: Trendy Terrorism: terrorist marketing, recruitment and intimidation) in Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle11. évfolyam (2023) 2. szám pp. 29–46.
- Outsourced Illegality: How Does Europe Make Others to Carry out the Unlawful Pushbacks of Migrants? In: Angela, Di Stasi; Rossana, Palladino; Angela, Festa (szerk.) MIGRATIONS RULE OF LAW AND EUROPEAN VALUES
- Nápoly, Olaszország : Editoriale Scientifica (2023) pp. 205-228.

**V. Presentation by the author**

- OTDK (2019)
- Young Researchers Workshop on Terrorism and Belligerency, University of Haifa, Izrael (2021)
- War and Peace Conference, NKE. Budapest(2022)
- Jog a Válság Idején. PPKE JÁK doktorandusz konferencia (2022)
- A jogtudomány sajátosságai, Széchenyi István Egyetem (2022)
- Second Doctoral Seminar of the Siracusa International Institute for Criminal
- Justice and Human Rights. Siracusa, Olaszország (2023)
- Workshop for young researchers migrations, rule of law and European values,
- University of Salerno and the European Union. Salerno, Olaszország (2023)
- War and Peace Conference II, NKE. Budapest (2023 szeptember)
- 20 Months After the Russian Invasion in Ukraine. What Has Been Done, What Needs to Be Done. Where Is the End? Romanian Centre for Russian Studies (University of Bucharest), Fridtjof Nansen Institute from Oslo Institute for Danube Region and Central Europe from Vienna (2023 november)
- Accepted: Young Researchers Workshop on Terrorism and Belligerency, University of Haifa, Izrael (2023 december)